As noted
in my previous blog entry (https://harrisonhartman.blogspot.com/2020/07/is-timing-everything-regarding-covid-19.html)
from July 19, 2020; the U.S. recession often associated with the COVID-19
coronavirus shutdowns may have already
ended. Given that the economy appeared
to deteriorate rapidly around the start of the shutdowns, one might conclude
that the only reason for the recession was the curtailing and in some cases the
stoppage of economic activity to control the pandemic.
Clearly,
the shutdowns contributed to the decline in real GDP, if the shutdowns were not
the main or sole factor. However, not
all of the evidence suggests that the U.S. economy was performing well prior to
the start of the pandemic. As I pointed
out in my July 19, 2020 blog entry (https://harrisonhartman.blogspot.com/2020/07/is-timing-everything-regarding-covid-19.html)
and my May 15, 2020 blog entry (https://harrisonhartman.blogspot.com/2020/05/when-did-us-downturn-start-and-what.html);
remember that estimated U.S. retail sales compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau fell in February 2020. This estimated decrease was before most, if not all of the U.S.
shutdowns implemented to try to contain the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic.
Also, remember that estimated U.S. employment not from the establishment survey (total nonfarm payroll
employment) but from the household survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics decreased for
4 out of 6 consecutive months from November 2019 through April 2020. (series LNS12000000 at
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost) The estimated decrease in employment in November
2019 was even further away from the COVID-19 coronavirus shutdowns than the
February 2020 drop in estimated U.S. retail sales. I tried to call attention to the decrease in
U.S. employment based on the household survey in my February 9, 2020 tweet (@HarrisonCHartm1)
and in at least two earlier blog entries:
https://harrisonhartman.blogspot.com/2020/03/is-temporary-dichotomy-emerging-between.html
and https://harrisonhartman.blogspot.com/2019/12/the-november-2019-jobs-report.html
.
At least
two other signs of economic problems for the U.S. economy appeared even sooner. Following a brief period when money velocity
increased most quarters, the velocity of the M1 money supply started decreasing
again, having fallen five out of six quarters from the fourth quarter of 2018
through the first quarter of 2020 (despite reaching a local maximum in the
first quarter of 2019) based on data from www.economagic.com. Readers may want to note that M2 velocity in
the U.S. has also been decreasing lately.
Previously, I tried to alert people about the decrease in money
velocity, including in this blog entry from November 4, 2019: https://harrisonhartman.blogspot.com/2019/11/us-money-velocity-fell-again-in-third.html
. My 2015 book It’s Velocity, Stupid! (short title) has more information about
money velocity.
The yield
curve is another factor to consider. If
I remember correctly, the yield curve or yield gap calculated as the five-year
U.S. Treasury interest rate minus the two-year U.S. Treasury interest rate
turned negative in December 2018. Other yield
curves or yield gaps followed suit. Of
particular interest may be the one-to-ten year yield curve. According to Bauer and Mertens (2018), the
U.S. Treasury one-to-ten year yield curve (probably based on monthly data)
turned negative two years or less before each U.S. recession in recent decades,
with only one instance when the one-to-ten year yield curve was negative but a
recession did not ensue within two years.
Thus it may be very foretelling that a recession followed the late March
2019 inversion of the one-to-ten year yield curve (based on daily data from the
FRED web page of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank) in about a year! (Note that my understanding is that the yield
curves are now positive.)
How strong
was the U.S. economy in February 2020 given possible warning signs such as (1) falling
money velocity, (2) an inverted yield curve soon before then if not in February
2020, (3) falling retail sales, and (4) household survey employment at times
falling soon before February 2020? Would
a less severe economic downturn have occurred without the COVID-19 coronavirus shutdowns? Regardless of the answers to those questions,
I reiterate my call (and likely the call of others) for more expansionary
fiscal policy and more expansionary monetary policy to try to help the economic
recovery.
Clearly,
the U.S. economy cannot completely recover without solving the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. However, if the U.S. economy was either in a
recession or heading into a recession before
the shutdowns, then this suggests at least to me a role for fiscal policy and monetary policy in
helping the U.S. economy to reach its potential.
(Please
realize that data revisions could impact the analysis in this blog entry. Thanks for your understanding.)