Trying to get a sense of the short-term future for the
U.S. economy could be difficult due to recent potentially mixed signals. This blog entry will probably be the first
part of a two-part blog. This first part
will focus mainly on employment, the yield curve, personal disposable income,
and money velocity.
Yesterday (Friday, February 7, 2020), the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that total U.S. nonfarm payroll employment
increased by 225,000 jobs in January 2020 based upon its survey of workplace
establishments. However, using data from
the BLS web page, I calculate that employment measured by the BLS household
survey fell in January 2020 by roughly 89,000 jobs. This is the second time in the last three
months when the BLS establishment survey reported an increase in total nonfarm
payroll employment but the household survey reported a decrease. Despite two decreases in employment from the
household survey in the last three months, readers should realize that the
reported decrease for November 2019 was relatively small, so that estimated
employment from the household survey for January 2020 is still greater than it
was in November 2019. (Note: I think that both the establishment survey data and the household survey data for employment are seasonally adjusted.) Readers can read
more about these statistics and releases at the following web pages.
The analysis may be less clear due to downward
revisions in previously reported estimates.
The Atlanta-Journal Constitution
reported on page A3 of today’s (Feb. 8) newspaper that previous employment estimates from 2018 and part of
2019 overstated job growth by more than 500,000 jobs.
Could the reported decrease in employment from the
household survey help to explain (1) the re-inversion of the yield curve based
on the two-year and five-year rates for U.S. Treasury debt, and (2) the one-day
decrease in stock indexes, both shown on CNBC yesterday (Feb. 7)? Inverted yield curves could possibly signal a
recession on the horizon.
If I remember correctly, Steve Liesman mentioned that
a possible explanation for the one-day lower stock indexes was that before
receiving the latest employment release from the BLS, some investors may have
expected another federal funds rate reduction announcement by the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve Bank. Now that appears less likely due to the
establishment survey exceeding expectations for the number of people employed
in January 2020. (The thinking may have
been that if another interest rate cut would come in the next two months, then
investors who would be essentially indifferent between stocks and U.S.
government debt would prefer stocks given that the return associated with newly
issued U.S. government debt would likely decrease.)
Perhaps comparable to the recent employment estimates
from the household survey, data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
web page show that U.S. real disposable personal income (measured after-taxes in
U.S. dollars with constant purchasing power) has fallen in two out of the last
three months of data available. However,
the decreases in real disposable personal income are in October 2019 and
December 2019 rather than November 2019 and January 2020, as real disposable
personal income data are not available as of this writing for January
2020. Even though U.S. nominal personal
disposable income (measured in after-tax dollars that have varying buying power
as prices in the economy change) did not decrease in October, November, or
December of 2019; decreases in real disposable personal income in two of
those three months reduce the amount of goods and services that households can
afford to buy in those months of decrease, all other things equal. If consumer spending is rising more than
income, what if anything does that indicate about debt levels in the U.S.? Readers can see more about the personal disposable income data at the
web link below.
As expected in my earlier blog post (https://harrisonhartman.blogspot.com/2019/12/is-velocity-of-us-m1-continuing-to.html), data on the FRED web page
of the Saint Louis Federal Reserve Bank indicate that money velocity for both
the M1 and M2 monetary aggregates fell in the fourth quarter of 2019, with
velocity measured on a seasonally adjusted basis. Nominal GDP spending failed to keep up with
money supply growth, as has been the case most quarters in the Not-So-Great
Recovery. Falling money velocity, which
happened most quarters in the U.S. after the fourth quarter of 2007, raises the
issue of how effective expansionary monetary policy has been in completing the
recovery from the Great Recession. I
will probably have more about U.S. money velocity and other macroeconomic
variables soon.
(Readers should note that subsequent data revisions
could change the analysis of this blog entry.)
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